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By  MATTHEW  RABIN* 
People like  to  help those who are helping them, and  to  hurt those who are 
hurting them. Outcomes reflecting such motivations are called fairness equilib- 
ria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each person maximizes the other's material 
payoffs, and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other's payoffs. It is 
shown  that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash  equilibrium is  a fairness 
equilibrium. If  payoffs  are  small,  fairness  equilibria are  roughly the  set  of 
mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes; if payoffs are large, fairness equilibria 
are roughly the set of Nash  equilibria. Several economic examples are consid- 
ered, and possible welfare implications of fairness are explored. (JEL A12, A13, 
D63,  C70) 
Most  current  economic  models  assume 
that people  pursue only their own material 
self-interest  and do not care about "social" 
goals.  One  exception  to  self-interest  which 
has received  some  attention  by economists 
is simple altruism: people may care not only 
about their own well-being,  but  also  about 
the well-being  of  others.  Yet  psychological 
evidence  indicates  that  most  altruistic be- 
havior is more complex: people  do not seek 
uniformly to help other people; rather, they 
do so according to how generous these other 
people  are being.  Indeed,  the same people 
who  are  altrustic to  other  altruistic people 
are  also  motivated  to  hurt  those  who  hurt 
them.  If  somebody  is  being  nice  to  you, 
fairness  dictates  that  you  be  nice  to  him. 
If somebody is being mean to you, fairness 
allows-and  vindictiveness  dictates-that 
you be mean to him. 
Clearly,  these  emotions  have  economic 
implications.  If  an  employee  has  been  ex- 
ceptionally  loyal,  then  a  manger  may feel 
some obligation to treat that employee well, 
even when it is not in his self-interest  to do 
so.  Other  examples  of  economic  behavior 
induced by social goals are voluntary reduc- 
tions  of water-use  during droughts, conser- 
vation  of  energy  to  help  solve  the  energy 
crisis (as documented,  for instance, in Ken- 
neth  E.  Train  et  al.  [1987]),  donations  to 
public  television  stations,  and  many forms 
of  voluntary  labor.  (Burton  A.  Weisbrod 
[1988] estimates  that,  in the  United  States, 
the  total  value  of  voluntary  labor  is  $74 
billion annually.) 
On the negative side, a consumer may not 
buy a  product  sold  by  a monopolist  at  an 
"unfair" price, even if the material value to 
the  consumer  is greater than the  price.  By 
not  buying,  the  consumer  lowers  his  own 
material  well-being  so  as  to  punish  the 
monopolist. An employee who feels  she has 
been  mistreated  by  a  firm may  engage  in 
acts of  sabotage.  Members of  a striking la- 
bor union may strike longer than is in their 
material interests because they want to pun- 
ish a firm for being unfair. 
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By modeling such emotions formally, one 
can begin to understand their economic and 
welfare  implications  more  rigorously  and 
more  generally.  In this  paper,  I  develop  a 
game-theoretic framework for incorporating 
such  emotions  into  a  broad  range  of  eco- 
nomic models.1 My framework incorporates 
the following three stylized facts: 
(A)  People  are willing to sacrifice their own 
material well-being  to  help  those  who 
are being kind. 
(B)  People  are willing to sacrifice their own 
material well-being to punish those who 
are being unkind. 
(C)  Both  motivations  (A)  and  (B)  have  a 
greater effect on behavior as the mate- 
rial cost of sacrificing becomes  smaller. 
In the next section, I briefly present some 
of the evidence from the psychological liter- 
ature regarding these  stylized facts. In Sec- 
tion II, I develop  a game-theoretic  solution 
concept  "fairness  equilibrium" that  incor- 
porates  these  stylized  facts.  Fairness  equi- 
libria do  not  in general  constitute  either  a 
subset or a superset of Nash equilibria; that 
is, incorporating fairness considerations can 
both add new predictions to economic mod- 
els  and eliminate  conventional  predictions. 
In  Section  III,  I present  some  general  re- 
sults  about  which  outcomes  in  economic 
situations are likely to be fairness equilibria. 
The  results demonstrate  the  special role of 
"mutual-max" outcomes (in which, given the 
other person's behavior, each person maxi- 
mizes  the  other's  material  payoffs)  and 
"mutual-min" outcomes (in which, given the 
other person's behavior, each person  mini- 
mizes the other's material payoffs). The fol- 
lowing results hold: 
(i)  Any  Nash  equilibrium that  is  either  a 
mutual-max  outcome  or  mutual-min 
outcome  is also a fairness equilibrium. 
(ii)  If  material  payoffs  are  small,  then, 
roughly, an outcome  is a fairness equi- 
librium if and only if it is a mutual-max 
or a mutual-min outcome. 
(iii)  If  material  payoffs  are  large,  then, 
roughly, an outcome  is a fairness equi- 
librium if and only if it is a Nash equi- 
librium. 
I hope  this framework will eventually be 
used to study the implications of fairness in 
different  economic  situations.  While  I  do 
not  develop  extended  applications  in  this 
paper,  Section  IV  contains  examples  illus- 
trating  the  economic  implications  of  my 
model of fairness. I develop a simple model 
of monopoly pricing and show that fairness 
implies that goods can only be sold at below 
the classical monopoly price. I then explore 
the  implications of fairness  in an extended 
labor example. 
I  consider  some  welfare  implications  of 
my model in Section V. Many researchers in 
welfare  economics  have long considered  is- 
sues of fairness to be  important in evaluat- 
ing  the  desirability  of  different  economic 
outcomes.  Yet  while  such  policy  analysis 
incorporates economists' judgments of fair- 
ness  and  equity,  it  often  ignores  the  con- 
cerns  for  fairness  and  equity  of  the  eco- 
nomic  actors being  studied.  By considering 
how  people's  attitudes  toward  fairness  in- 
fluence  their  behavior  and  well-being,  my 
framework can  help  incorporate  such con- 
cerns more directly into policy analysis and 
welfare economics. 
While my model suggests that the behav- 
ioral  implications  of  fairness  are  greatest 
when the material consequences  of an eco- 
nomic  interaction  are  not  too  large,  there 
'While  many  recognize  the  importance  of  social 
motivations  in  economic  phenomena,  these  emotions 
have  not  been  investigated  widely  within  the  formal 
apparatus of mainstream economics. Other researchers 
who  have  done  so  include  George  Akerlof  (1982), 
Peter H. Huang and Ho-Mou Wu (1992), Vai-Lam Mui 
(1992),  and Julio J. Rotemberg  (1992); but these  and 
other  economic  models  have  tended  to  be  context- 
specific. While  the  current version  of  my model  only 
applies  to  two-person  complete-information  games,  it 
applies to  all such games. If it is extended  naturally, it 
will  therefore  have specific consequences  in  any eco- 
nomic or social situation that can be modeled  by non- 
cooperative  game theory. (By its generality, my model 
may also  contribute  to  psychological  research.  While 
some  psychology  researchers  have  tried  to  formulate 
general principles of behavior, I believe  that noncoop- 
erative  game  theory  provides  a  useful  language  for 
doing so more carefully. My model, for instance, helps 
demonstrate that some seemingly different behaviors in 
different contexts are explicable by common underlying 
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are several reasons why this does not imply 
that  the  economic  implications  of  fairness 
are minor. First, while it is true that fairness 
influences  behavior  most  when  material 
stakes are small, it is not clear that it makes 
little  difference  when  material  stakes  are 
large. Little empirical research on the  eco- 
nomic implications of fairness has been con- 
ducted, and much  anecdotal  evidence  sug- 
gests  that  people  sacrifice  substantial 
amounts of money to reward or punish kind 
or  unkind  behavior.  Second,  many  major 
economic  institutions,  most  notably decen- 
tralized markets, are best described as accu- 
mulations  of  minor  economic  interactions, 
so that the aggregate implications of depar- 
tures  from  standard theory  in  these  cases 
may be substantial. Third, the fairness com- 
ponent  of a person's overall well-being  can 
be  influenced  substantially  by  even  small 
material changes. 
Finally,  even  if  material  incentives  in  a 
situation are so large as to dominate behav- 
ior,  fairness  still  matters.  Welfare  eco- 
nomics should be  concerned  not  only with 
the  efficient  allocation  of  material  goods, 
but also with designing institutions such that 
people  are happy about the way they inter- 
act  with  others.  For  instance,  if  a  person 
leaves an exchange in which he was treated 
unkindly, then  his unhappiness  at being  so 
treated should be  a consideration  in evalu- 
ating the efficiency of that exchange. Armed 
with  well-founded  psychological  assump- 
tions,  economists  can  start to  address  the 
nonmaterial  benefits  and  costs  of  the  free 
market and other institutions.2 
I conclude the paper in Section VI with a 
discussion  of  some  of  the  shortfalls  of  my 
model and an outline of possible extensions. 
I.  Fairness in Games: Some Evidence 
In this section, I discuss some psychologi- 
cal  research that  demonstrates  the  stylized 
facts outlined in the Introduction. Consider 
fact A: "People  are willing to sacrifice their 
own material well-being  to  help  those  who 
are  being  kind."  The  attempt  to  provide 
public goods without  coercion  is  an arche- 
typical  example  in  which  departures  from 
pure  self-interest  can be  beneficial  to  soci- 
ety, and it has been studied by psychologists 
as  a  means  of  testing  for  the  existence  of 
altruism and cooperation. Laboratory exper- 
iments of public goods have been conducted 
by,  among  others,  John  M.  Orbell  (1978), 
Gerald  Marwell  and  Ruth  Ames  (1981), 
Werner Guth (1982), Alphons  J. C. van de 
Kragt  et  al.  (1983),  R.  Mark  Isaac  et  al. 
(1984,  1985), Oliver Kim and Mark Walker 
(1984), James Andreoni (1988a, b), and Isaac 
James Walker (1988a, b). These experiments 
typically involve subjects choosing how much 
to  contribute  toward a public  good,  where 
the  self-interested  contribution  is  small or 
zero.  The  evidence  from these  experiments 
is that people  cooperate  to a degree greater 
than would be implied by pure self-interest. 
Many of these  experiments are surveyed in 
Robyn  M.  Dawes  and  Richard  H.  Thaler 
(1988), who conclude  that, for most experi- 
ments  of  one-shot  public-good  decisions  in 
which the  individually optimal contribution 
is close  to  0 percent,  the  contribution  rate 
ranges between  40 percent  and 60 percent 
of the socially optimal level.3 
These experiments indicate that contribu- 
tions toward public goods are not, however, 
the result of "pure altruism," where people 
seek unconditionally to help others. Rather, 
the willingness to help seems  highly contin- 
gent on the behavior of others. If people  do 
not  think  that  others  are  doing  their  fair 
share, then  their  enthusiasm for sacrificing 
for others is greatly diminished. 
2Indeed,  I show in Section V that there exist situa- 
tions  in which  the  unique  fairness  equilibrium leaves 
both  players feeling  that  they  have been  treated  un- 
kindly.  This  means  that  negative  emotions  may  be 
endogenously  generated  by particular economic  struc- 
tures.  I  also  state  and  prove  an  unhappy  theorem: 
every  game contains at least one such "unkind equilib- 
rium." That  is,  there  does  not  exist  any situation  in 
which players necessarily depart with positive feelings. 
3Further examples of stylized fact A can be found in 
Richard E.  Goranson  and Leonard  Berkowitz (1966), 
Martin Greenberg  and David Frisch (1972), Elizabeth 
Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer (1982), and Daniel Kah- 
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Indeed,  stylized  fact  B  says that  people 
will  in  some  situations  not  only  refuse  to 
help others, but will sacrifice to hurt others 
who  are  being  unfair.  This  idea  has  been 
most  widely  explored  in  the  "ultimatum 
game," discussed at length in Thaler (1988). 
The ultimatum game consists of two people 
splitting  some  fixed  amount  of  money  X 
according  to  the  following  rules:  a  "pro- 
poser" offers some  division of  X  to  a "de- 
cider." If the decider says yes, they split the 
money  according  to  the  proposal.  If  the 
decider  says no,  they  both  get  no  money. 
The result of pure self-interest is clear: pro- 
posers will never offer more than a penny, 
and deciders  should  accept  any offer of  at 
least a penny. Yet experiments clearly reject 
such behavior. Data show that, even in one- 
shot settings, deciders are willing to punish 
unfair  offers  by  rejecting  them,  and  pro- 
posers  tend  to make fair offers.4 Some  pa- 
pers  illustrating stylized fact  B  are  Goran- 
son and Berkowitz (1966), Jerald Greenberg 
(1978), Guth et al. (1982), Kahneman et al. 
(1986a,b),  and Alvin E. Roth et al. (1991). 
Stylized fact  C says that people  will  not 
be  as willing to sacrifice a great amount of 
money to maintain fairness as they would be 
with  small  amounts  of  money.  It  is  tested 
and partially confirmed in Gerald Leventhal 
and David Anderson  (1970), but its validity 
is intuitive to most people.  If the ultimatum 
game  were  conducted  with  $1,  then  most 
deciders  would  reject  a  proposed  split  of 
($0.90,  $0.10). If the  ultimatum game were 
conducted with $10 million, the vast major- 
ity  of  deciders  would  accept  a  proposed 
split  of  ($9  million,  $1  million).5 Consider 
also the following example from Dawes  and 
Thaler (1988 p. 145): 
In the  rural areas around Ithaca it is 
common for farmers to put some fresh 
produce on a table by the road. There 
is  a  cash  box  on  the  table,  and  cus- 
tomers  are expected  to  put money  in 
the  box  in  return  for  the  vegetables 
they take. The box has just a small slit, 
so money can only be put in, not taken 
out.  Also,  the  box  is  attached  to  the 
table, so no one  can (easily) make off 
with  the  money.  We  think  that  the 
farmers who use this system have just 
about  the  right model  of  human  na- 
ture.  They  feel  that  enough  people 
will volunteer to pay for the fresh corn 
to  make  it  worthwhile  to  put  it  out 
there. The farmers also know that if it 
were  easy enough  to  take the  money, 
someone would do so. 
This example is in the spirit of stylized fact 
C:  people  succumb  to  the  temptation  to 
pursue their interests at the expense of oth- 
ers in proportion to the  profitability of  do- 
ing so. 
From  an  economist's  point  of  view,  it 
matters not only whether stylized facts A-C 
are true, but whether  they  have  important 
economic  implications.  Kahneman  et  al. 
(1986a, b)  present  strong  arguments  that 
these  general  issues  are  indeed  important. 
For anyone unconvinced of the importance 
of social goals empirically or intuitively, one 
purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  help  test  the 
proposition  theoretically:  will  adding  fair- 
ness to economic  models  substantially alter 
conclusions?  If  so,  in  what  situations  will 
conclusions be altered, and in what way? 
II.  A Model 
To formalize fairness, I adopt the frame- 
work  developed  by  John  Geanakoplos, 
David  Pearce,  and  Ennio  Stacchetti  (1989) 
(hereafter,  GPS). They modify conventional 
game theory by allowing payoffs to  depend 
on players' beliefs as well as on their actions 
(see  also Itzhak Gilboa  and David  Schmei- 
dler,  1988).6 While  explicitly incorporating 
4The  decision  by proposers to make fair offers can 
come  from  at  least  two  motivations:  self-interested 
proposers might be  fair because  they know unfair of- 
fers may be rejected, and proposers themselves  have a 
preference for being fair. 
5Clearly, however, a  higher percentage  of  deciders 
would turn down an offer of ($9,999,999.90, $0.10) than 
turn  down  ($0.90,  $0.10).  In  his  footnote  6,  Thaler 
(1988) concurs with these  intuitions, while pointing out 
the  obvious  difficulty in financing experiments  of  the 
scale needed  to test them fully. 
6Outside  the  context  of  noncooperative  game  the- 
ory, Akerlof  and William T. Dickens  (1982) presented 
an  earlier  model  incorporating  beliefs  directly  into 
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Player  2 
Opera  Boxing 
Opera  2X,X  0,0 
Player  1 
Boxing  0,0  X,2X 
FIGURE  1.  EXAMPLE  1: BATTLE  OF THE  SEXES 
beliefs  substantially complicates  analysis, I 
argue that the approach is necessary to cap- 
ture  aspects  of  fairness.  Fortunately,  GPS 
show  that  many  standard  techniques  and 
results have useful analogues in these  "psy- 
chological games." 
In  developing  my  model  of  fairness,  I 
extend  the  GPS  approach  with  an  addi- 
tional step which I believe will prove essen- 
tial  for  incorporating psychology  into  eco- 
nomic research: I derive psychological games 
from basic "material games." Whereas GPS 
provide  a  technique  for  analyzing  games 
that  already  incorporate  emotions,  I  use 
assumptions  about  fairness  to  derive  psy- 
chological games from the more traditional 
material  description  of  a  situation.  Doing 
so,  I develop  a model  that can be  applied 
generally and can be  compared  directly to 
standard economic  analysis. 
To motivate both  the  general framework 
and my specific model,  consider Example 1 
(see  Fig. 1), where  X  is a positive number. 
(Throughout  the  paper,  I  shall  represent 
games with the positive "scale variable" X. 
This  allows  me  to  consider  the  effects  of 
increasing  or  decreasing  a  game's  stakes 
without  changing  its  fundamental  strategic 
structure.) This is a standard battle-of-the- 
sexes game: two people  prefer to go to the 
same  event  together,  but  each  prefers  a 
different event. Formally, both players pre- 
fer to play either (opera, opera) or (boxing, 
boxing)  rather  than  not  coordinating;  but 
player 1 prefers (opera, opera), and player 2 
prefers (boxing, boxing). 
The  payoffs  are  a  function  only  of  the 
moves made by the  players. Suppose,  how- 
ever, that player 1 (say) cares not only about 
his own payoff, but depending on player 2's 
motives, he cares also about player 2's pay- 
off.  In  particular, if  player  2  seems  to  be 
intentionally helping player 1, then player 1 
will be motivated to help player 2; if player 
2 seems to be intentionally hurting player 1, 
then player 1 will wish to hurt player 2. 
Suppose  player 1 believes  (a) that player 
2  is  playing boxing,  and  (b)  that  player  2 
believes  player  1  is  playing  boxing.  Then 
player 1 concludes that player 2 is choosing 
an  action  that  helps  both  players  (playing 
opera  would  hurt  both  players).  Because 
player  2  is  not  being  either  generous  or 
mean, neither stylized fact A nor B applies. 
Thus,  player  1  will  be  neutral  about  his 
effect on player 2 and will pursue his mate- 
rial  self-interest  by  playing boxing.  If  this 
argument is repeated  for player 2, one  can 
show  that,  in  the  natural  sense,  (boxing, 
boxing) is  an  equilibrium: if  it  is  common 
knowledge  that  this  will  be  the  outcome, 
then each player is maximizing his utility by 
playing his strategy. 
Of  course,  (boxing, boxing) is  a  conven- 
tional Nash equilibrium in this game. To see 
the importance of fairness, suppose player 1 
believes  (a)  that  player 2 will  play boxing, 
and (b) that player 2 believes that player 1 is 
playing opera. Now player 1 concludes  that 
player 2 is lowering her own payoff in order 
to  hurt  him.  Player  1  will  therefore  feel 
hostility  toward  player  2  and  will  wish  to 
harm her. If this hostility is strong enough, 
player 1 may be willing to sacrifice his own 
material well-being,  and  play opera  rather 
than boxing. Indeed,  if both players have a 
strong  enough  emotional  reaction  to  each 
other's behavior, then (opera, boxing) is an 
equilibrium. If it is common knowledge that 
they are playing this outcome,  then,  in the 
induced  atmosphere  of  hostility, both play- 
ers will wish to stick with it. 
Notice  the  central  role  of  expectations: 
player l's  payoffs do not  depend  simply on 
the  actions  taken,  but  also  on  his  beliefs 
about player 2's motives. Could these  emo- 
tions  be  directly  modeled  by  transforming 
the  payoffs, so  that  one  could  analyze this 
transformed game in the conventional way? 
This turns out to be impossible. In the natu- 
ral  sense,  both  of  the  equilibria  discussed 
above are strict: each player strictly prefers 
to play his strategy given the equilibrium. In 
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strictly prefers playing boxing to  opera.  In 
the  equilibrium  (opera,  boxing)  player  1 
strictly prefers opera  to boxing. No  matter 
what  payoffs  are  chosen,  these  statements 
would be contradictory if payoffs depended 
solely  on  the  actions  taken.  To  formalize 
these  preferences,  therefore,  it is necessary 
to  develop  a model  that  explicitly incorpo- 
rates beli-efs.7  I now construct such a model, 
applicable  to  all two-person,  finite-strategy 
games. 
Consider a two-player, normal form game 
with  (mixed)  strategy  sets  S1  and  S2  for 
players  1 and  2,  derived  from finite  pure- 
strategy sets A1 and A2. Let vi:  SI x S2 -l- 
be player i's  material payoffs.8 
From  this  "material  game,"  I  now  con- 
struct a "psychological game" as defined in 
GPS. I assume that each player's subjective 
expected  utility when  he  chooses  his strat- 
egy  will  depend  on  three  factors:  (i)  his 
strategy,  (ii)  his  beliefs  about  the  other 
player's strategy choice,  and (iii) his beliefs 
about  the  other  player's beliefs  about  his 
strategy. Throughout, I shall use the follow- 
ing notation:  a1 E SI  and  a2 E S2  represent 
the  strategies  chosen  by  the  two  players; 
b, E S,  and  b2 E S2  represent,  respectively, 
player 2's beliefs  about what strategy player 
1 is  choosing,  and player  l's  beliefs  about 
what  strategy player 2  is  choosing;  c1 E S1 
and  c2 eS2  represent  player  l's  beliefs 
about what player 2 believes player l's strat- 
egy  is,  and  player  2's  beliefs  about  what 
player 1 believes player 2's strategy is. 
The  first  step  to  incorporating  fairness 
into  the  analysis  is  to  define  a  "kindness 
function,"  fM(ai,  b1), which  measures  how 
kind player i is being to player j. (I assume 
in  this  paper  that  players  have  a  shared 
notion  of  kindness  and  fairness  and  that 
they apply these standards symmetrically. In 
Rabin  (1992),  I  show  that  most  of  the  re- 
sults of this paper hold if multiple kindness 
functions are allowed.) 
If player i believes that player j  is choos- 
ing strategy b1.,  how kind is player i being by 
choosing  ai? Player i is choosing the payoff 
pair (7ri(ai, bj),  i1j(bj,  at))  from  among  the 
set of all payoffs feasible if player j is choos- 
ing  strategy  b1 [i.e.,  from  among  the  set 
fl(bj)  {(wi(a,  bj), wj(bj, a)) a E Si}].  The 
players might have  a variety of  notions  of 
how kind player i  is being by choosing  any 
given  point  in  11(bj). While  I  shall  now 
proceed with a specific (and purposely sim- 
plistic) measure  of  kindness,  I show in the 
Appendix  that the results of this paper are 
valid for any kindness function that specifies 
the equitable payoffs as some rule for shar- 
ing along the Pareto frontier. 
Let  rjh(bj)  be player j's  highest payoff in 
fl(bi),  and  let  '-f(b1)  be  player j's  lowest 
payoff among points that are Pareto-efficient 
in  H(b1).  Let  the  "equitable  payoff"  be 
7je(bj)  =  [7rjL(b)  +  7ri(bj)]/2.  When  the 
Pareto frontier is linear, this payoff literally 
corresponds to the payoff player j would get 
if  player  i  "splits the  difference" with  her 
among Pareto-efficient  points. More gener- 
ally,  it  provides  a  crude  reference  point 
against  which  to  measure  how  generous 
player  i  is  being  to  player  j.  Finally,  let 
7wmin(bj) be  the  worst  possible  payoff  for 
player j  in the set  fl(bj). 
From these payoffs, I define the kindness 
function.  This function  captures how much 
more  than  or  less  than  player  j's  equit- 
able payoff player i  believes  he is giving to 
player  j. 
Definition 1:  Player i's kindness to player j 
is given by 
fi (aj ,bj) =_ 7Tj(bj,ai) 
- 
j(  bJ) 
Ir  )(bj),  ah)  -  i(bj) 
I  f  bi.p( 1).min  (b1) =O,  then  fi(ai,  bj) =0. 
7My point here is that the results I get could not be 
gotten simply by respecifying the payoffs over the phys- 
ical actions in the game. Van Kolpin (1993) argues that 
one can apply conventional game theory to these games 
by including the choice of beliefs  as additional parts of 
plavers' strategies. 
I  shall  emphasize  pure  strategies  in  this  paper, 
though  formal  definitions  allow  for  mixed  strategies, 
and  all  stated  results  apply  to  them.  One  reason  I 
de-emphasize mixed strategies is that the characteriza- 
tion  of  preferences  over  mixed  strategies  is  not 
straightforward. In psychological games, there can be a 
difference  between  interpreting mixed strategies  liter- 
ally as purposeful mixing by a player versus interpret- 
ing them as uncertainty by other players. Such issues of 
interpretation are less important in conventional game 
theory,  and  consequently  incorporating mixed  strate- 
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Note  that  f, = 0 if and only if player i  is 
trying to give player j  her equitable payoff.9 
If fi < 0, player i is giving player j  less than 
her  equitable  payoff.  Recalling  the  defini- 
tion  of  the  equitable  payoff, there  are two 
general  ways for  fi  to  be  negative:  either 
player i is grabbing more than his share on 
the Pareto frontier of  H1(b) or he is choos- 
ing  an  inefficient  point  in  H(b1).  Finally, 
fi > 0 if player i is giving player j more than 
her  equitable  payoff.  Recall  that  this  can 
happen only if the Pareto frontier of  H(bj) 
is a nonsingleton; otherwise  7rr =  7Jh 
I shall let the function  fj(bj, ci) represent 
player i's beliefs  about how kindly player j 
is treating him. While  I shall keep  the  two 
notationally  distinct,  this  function  is  for- 
mally equivalent to the function fj(aj, bi). 
Definition 2:  Player i's belief about how kind 
player j  is being to him is given by 
-  ri(ci, bj)  )-_iT(Cj) 
f j ( bj,~  ci  )  7  )=_#7  min 
If  ri  C  i  (Ci) = O,  then fj(bj, cj) = 0. 
Because  the  kindness  functions  are nor- 
malized,  the values  of  fif()  and  fj(*)  must 
lie in the interval [-  1,2]  Further, the kind- 
ness  functions  are  insensitive  to  positive 
affine transformations of  the  material  pay- 
offs (overall utility,  as  defined  shortly, will 
be sensitive to such transformations). 
These kindness functions can now be used 
to  specify  fully  the  players'  preferences. 
Each  player  i  chooses  ai  to  maximize  his 
expected  utility Ui(ai, bj, ci), which incorpo- 
rates both his material utility and the play- 
ers' shared notion of fairness: 
Ui(ai  bj, ci) 
=  ri(ai,  bj) + fj(bj, ci)  [1 + fi(ai,  bj)] . 
The  central  behavioral  feature  of  these 
preferences  reflects the  original discussion. 
If player i  believes  that player j  is treating 
him badly-  fj()  < 0-then  player i wishes 
to  treat player j  badly, by choosing  an ac- 
tion  ai such that fif()  is low or negative. If 
player  j  is  treating  player  i  kindly,  then 
fj(  ) will be positive,  and player i  will wish 
to treat player j  kindly. Of course, the spec- 
ified utility function is such that players will 
trade off their preference for fairness against 
their material well-being,  and material pur- 
suits may override concerns for fairness. 
Because  the  kindness  functions  are 
bounded  above and below, this utility func- 
tion  reflects  stylized fact  C: the  bigger the 
material payoffs, the less the players' behav- 
ior reflects their concern for fairness. Thus, 
the  behavior in these  games  is  sensitive  to 
the  scale  of  material  payoffs.  Obviously,  I 
have  not  precisely  determined  the  relative 
power of fairness versus material interest or 
even given units for the material payoffs; my 
results  in  specific  examples  are,  therefore, 
only qualitative. 
Notice that the preferences  Vi(ai, bj, ci) 
rri(ai, bj) + fj(bj, ci) . fi(ai,  bj)  would  yield 
precisely  the  same  behavior  as  the  utility 
function  Ui(ai, bj, ci). I have made the pref- 
erences  slightly more  complicated  so  as to 
capture one bit of realism: whenever player 
j  is  treating  player  i  unkindly,  player  i's 
overall utility will be lower than his material 
payoffs.  That  is,  fj()  < 0  implies  Ui()  < 
7ri  ). If a person is treated badly, he leaves 
the  situation  bitter,  and his  ability to  take 
revenge only partly makes up for the loss in 
welfare.  1 
Because these preferences form a psycho- 
logical game, I can use the concept  of  psy- 
chological Nash equilibrium defined by GPS; 
this  is  simply the  analog  of  Nash  equilib- 
rium for psychological games, imposing the 
additional  condition  that  all  higher-order 
9When  7h  =  min,  all of  player i's  responses  to  b 
yield player j  the  same payoff. Therefore,  there  is no 
issue of kindness, and fi = 0. 
'0As Lones  Smith has pointed  out  to  me,  however, 
this  specification  has  one  unrealistic  implication:  if 
player 1 is being "mean" to player 2 (f1 < 0), then the 
nicer  player 2  is to  player  1, the  happier  is player  1, 
even if one ignores the implication for material payoffs. 
While  this  is  perhaps  correct  if  people  enjoy making 
suckers of others, it is more likely that a player will feel 
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beliefs  match  actual  behavior.  I  shall  call 
the solution concept  thus defined  "fairness 
equilibrium."  11 
Definition 3:  The  pair of  strategies  (aj,a2) 
E  (S1,  S2)  is  a  fairness  equilibrium if,  for 
i=1,2,  j*i, 
(1)  ai  E argmaxaEsiUi;(a,bj,ci) 
(2)  ci=bi=ai. 
Is  this  solution  concept  consistent  with 
the earlier discussion of Example 1? In par- 
ticular,  is  the  "hostile"  outcome  (opera, 
boxing) a fairness equilibrium? If c1 = b1 = 
a1  = opera  and  c2 = b2 = a2 = boxing,  then 
player 2 feels  hostility, and f2 = -  1. Thus, 
player l's  utility from playing U  is 0 (with 
fl  = -1)  and from playing boxing it is X -1 
(with f1 = 0). Thus, if X < 1, player 1 prefers 
opera to boxing given these beliefs. Player 2 
prefers  boxing to  opera.  For  X < 1, there- 
fore,  (opera,  boxing) is  an  equilibrium.  In 
this  equilibrium,  both  players  are  hostile 
toward each other and unwilling to coordi- 
nate with the other if it means conceding to 
the other player.12 
Because  the players will feel  no  hostility 
if they coordinate, both (opera, opera)  and 
(boxing, boxing)  are  also  equilibria for  all 
values of  X.  Again,  these  are conventional 
outcomes;  the  interesting  implication  of 
Player  2 
Cooperate  Defect 
Cooperate  4X,F4X  ,6X 
Player  1 
Defect  6X,O  X,X 
FIGURE  2.  EXAMPLE  2: PRISONER'S  DILEMMA 
fairness  in  Example  1  is  that  the  players' 
hostility may lead  each  to undertake costly 
punishment  of  the  other.  The  game  Pris- 
oner's  Dilemma  shows,  by  contrast,  that 
fairness may also lead each player to sacri- 
fice to help the other player (see  Fig. 2). 
Consider the cooperative outcome, (coop- 
erate,  cooperate).  If  it  is  common  knowl- 
edge  to  the  players  that  they  are  playing 
(cooperate,  cooperate),  then  each  player 
knows that the  other  is sacrificing his own 
material  well-being  in  order  to  help  him. 
Each  will  thus want  to  help  the  other  by 
playing cooperate,  so  long  as  the  material 
gains from defecting are not too large. Thus, 
if X  is small enough (less than -),  (cooper- 
ate, cooperate) is a fairness equilibrium. 
For  any value  of  X,  however,  the  Nash 
equilibrium (defect, defect) is also a fairness 
equilibrium. This is because  if it is common 
knowledge that they are playing (defect, de- 
fect), then each player knows that the other 
is not willing to sacrifice X  in order to give 
the  other  6X.  Thus,  both  players will  be 
hostile; in the outcome (defect, defect), each 
player is  satisfying both  his  desire  to  hurt 
the other and his material self-interest. 
The prisoner's dilemma illustrates two is- 
sues  I  discussed  earlier.  First,  one  cannot 
fully capture realistic behavior by invoking 
"pure altruism." In Example 2, both (coop- 
erate,  cooperate)  and  (defect,  defect)  are 
fairness equilibria, and I believe this predic- 
tion  of  the  model  is  in  line  with  reality. 
People  sometimes  cooperate,  but  if  each 
expects the other player to defect, then they 
both will. Yet, having both of these as equi- 
libria  is  inconsistent  with  pure  altruism. 
Suppose that player l's concern for player 2 
were  independent  of  player  2's  behavior. 
1iGPS  prove the  existence  of  an equilibrium in all 
psychological  games  meeting  certain  continuity  and 
convexity conditions. The kindness function used in the 
text does not yield utility functions that are everywhere 
continuous,  so  that  GPS's  theorem  does  not  apply 
(although  I  have  found  no  counterexamples  to  exis- 
tence).  As  I discuss in Appendix  A,  continuous  kind- 
ness functions that are very similar to the one  used in 
the  text,  and  for which  all  general  results  hold,  can 
readily be constructed. Such kindness functions would 
guarantee existence using the GPS theorem. 
12For  X <  1, (boxing, opera) is also an equilibrium. 
In  this  equilibrium,  both  players  are  with  common 
knowledge  "conceding,"  and both  players feel  hostile 
toward  each  other  because  both  are  giving up  their 
best possible  payoff in order to hurt the other player. 
The  fact  that,  for  X < 1,  (opera,  boxing)  is  an 
equilibrium, but (boxing, opera)  is not,  might suggest 
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Then if he thought that player 2 was playing 
cooperate,  he  would  play cooperate  if  and 
only  if  he  were  willing  to  give  up  2X  in 
order  to  help  player 2  by 4X;  if  player  1 
thought  that  player  2  was  playing  defect, 
then he would play cooperate  if and only if 
he  were  willing  to  give  up  X  in  order  to 
help player 2 by 5X.  Clearly, then, if player 
1 plays cooperate  in response to cooperate, 
he would play cooperate  in response to de- 
fect.  In  order  to  get  the  two  equilibria, 
player 1 must care differentially about help- 
ing  (or  hurting) player 2  as  a  function  of 
player 2's behavior.13 
The  second  issue  that  the  prisoner's 
dilemma illustrates is the role of intention- 
ality in attitudes about fairness. Psychologi- 
cal  evidence  indicates  that  people  deter- 
mine  the  fairness  of  others  according  to 
their  motives,  not  solely  according  to  ac- 
tions  taken.14  In  game-theoretic  terms, 
"motives" can  be  inferred  from  a  player's 
choice of strategy from among those choices 
he has, so what strategy a player could have 
chosen (but did not) can be as important as 
what  strategy he  actually chooses.  For  ex- 
ample,  people  differentiate  between  those 
who  take  a generous  action by choice  and 
those  who  are  forced  to  do  so.  Consider 
Example 3, depicted in Figure 3. 
This is the "prisoner's dilemma" in which 
player  2  is  forced  to  cooperate.  It  corre- 
sponds,  for  instance,  to  a  case  in  which 
someone  is forced to contribute to a public 
good. In this degenerate  game, player 1 will 
always defect,  so  the  unique  fairness  equi- 
librium is (defect, cooperate). This contrasts 
to the possibility of the (cooperate,  cooper- 
ate) equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma. 
The difference is that now player 1 will feel 
no positive regard for player 2's "decision" 
to cooperate, because player 2 is not volun- 
Player  2 
C 
C  4X,74X 
Player  1 
D  6X,L 
FIGURE  3.  EXAMPLE  3: PRISONER'S  NON-DILEMMA 
Player  2 
Dare  Chicken 
Dare  -2X,-2X  2X,O 
Player  1 
Chicken  0,2X  X,X 
FIGURE  4.  EXAMPLE  4: CHICKEN 
tarily doing player 1 any favors; you are not 
grateful  to  somebody  who  is  simply doing 
what he must.15 
In both Examples 1 and 2, adding fairness 
creates new equilibria but does  not  get rid 
of  any (strict), Nash  equilibria. Example  4, 
the  game  "Chicken"  16  illustrates that  fair- 
ness  can rule out strict Nash equilibria (see 
Fig. 4). 
This  game  is widely  studied  by political 
scientists, because it captures well situations 
in which nations challenge each other. Each 
country  hopes  to  "dare"  while  the  other 
country  backs  down  [outcomes  (dare, 
chicken)  and  (chicken,  dare)];  but  both 
dread most of all the outcome (dare, dare), 
in which neither nation backs down. 
130f  course,  I am ruling out  "income  effects" and 
the  like  as  explanations; but  that  is  clearly not  what 
causes  the  multiplicity  of  equilibria  in  public-goods 
experiments. 
14Greenberg and  Frisch (1972)  and  Goranson  and 
Berkowitz  (1966)  find  evidence  for  this  proposition, 
though  not  in  as  extreme  a  form  as  implied  by  my 
model. 
15Player  l's complete indifference to player 2's plight 
here  is  because  I  have  excluded  any degree  of  pure 
altruism from my model.  Indeed,  many of  the  strong 
results throughout the  paper are because  I am ruling 
out  ure altruism. 
While  I  will  stick to  the  conventional  name  for 
this game, I note that it is extremely speciesist-there 
is  little  evidence  that  chickens  are  less  brave  than 
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Consider  the  Nash  equilibrium  (dare, 
chicken), where player 1 "dares" and player 
2  "chickens  out."  Is  it  a  fairness  equilib- 
rium? In this outcome,  it is common knowl- 
edge that player 1 is hurting player 2 to help 
himself.  If  X  is  small  enough,  player  2 
would  therefore  deviate  by  playing  dare, 
thus hurting both player 1 and himself. Thus, 
for small X, (dare, chicken) is not a fairness 
equilibrium;  nor,  obviously,  is  (chicken, 
dare).  Both  Nash  equilibria  are,  for  small 
enough  X,  inconsistent with fairness. 
Whereas fairness does  not rule out Nash 
equilibrium in Examples 1 and 2, it does  so 
in  Example  4.  The  next  section  presents 
several propositions  about fairness  equilib- 
rium, including one  pertaining to why fair- 
ness  rules  out  Nash  equilibria in  Chicken, 
but not  in Prisoner's Dilemma  or Battle  of 
the Sexes. 
III.  Some General Propositions 
In  the  pure-strategy  Nash  equilibria  of 
Battle  of  the  Sexes,  each  taking the  other 
player's  strategy  as  given,  each  player  is 
maximizing  the  other  player's  payoff  by 
maximizing  his  own  payoffs.  Thus,  each 
player can satisfy his own material interests 
without  violating  his  sense  of  fairness.  In 
the Nash equilibrium of Prisoner's Dilemma, 
each player is minimizing the other player's 
payoff  by  maximizing  his  own.  Thus,  bad 
will is generated, and "fairness" means that 
each player will try to hurt the other. Once 
again,  players  simultaneously  satisfy  their 
own material interests  and their notions  of 
fairness. 
These  two  types  of  outcomes-where 
players mutually maximize each other's ma- 
terial payoffs, and where they mutually min- 
imize  each  other's  material  payoffs-will 
play  an  important role  in many of  the  re- 
sults  of  this  paper,  so  I  define  them  for- 
mally: 
Definition  4: A  strategy  pair  (a1, a2)  E 
(S1  S2)  is a mutual-max outcome if, for  i= 
1,2,  jii,  aieargmaxaE  Si7j(a,  a). 
Definition  5:  A  strategy  pair  (a1, a2)  E 
(SP S2) is a mutual-min outcome  if, for  i= 
1,2,  j  i,  ai E argminaeSi 7j(a, a1). 
The  following  definitions  will  also  prove 
useful.  Each of  these  definitions  character- 
izes  an outcome  of  a game in terms of  the 
value  of  "kindness" fi  induced  by each  of 
the players. 
Definition 6:  (a) An outcome is strictly  posi- 
tive if, for i = 1,2,  fi > 0. (b) An outcome  is 
weakly positive  if, for  i = 1, 2, fi 2 0. (c) An 
outcome  is  strictly negative  if,  for  i =  1,2, 
fi < 0.  (d) An outcome  is weakly negative if, 
for i = 1, 2, fi < 0. (e) An outcome is neutral 
if,  for  i = 1,2,  fi = 0.  (f)  An  outcome  is 
mixed if, for i=1,2,  j#i,  fifi<0. 
Using these  definitions, I state a proposi- 
tion about two types of Nash equilibria that 
will  necessarily  also  be  fairness  equilibria 
(all proofs are in Appendix B). 
PROPOSITION  1: Suppose that  (a1, a2)  is 
a Nash equilibrium,  and either a mutual-max 
outcome  or  a  mutual-min  outcome.  Then 
(a1, a2)  is a fairness equilibrium. 
Note  that the pure-strategy Nash equilib- 
ria in Chicken do not satisfy either premise 
of  Proposition  1.  In  each,  one  player  is 
maximizing  the  other's  payoff,  while  the 
other is minimizing the first's payoff. If X  is 
small  enough,  so  that  emotions  dominate 
material  payoffs,  then  the  player  who  is 
being  hurt  will  choose  to  hurt  the  other 
player, even when this action is self-destruc- 
tive, and will play dare rather than chicken. 
While  Proposition  1  characterizes  Nash 
equilibria that are necessarily fairness equi- 
libria,  Proposition  2  characterizes  which 
outcomes-Nash  or  non-Nash-can  possi- 
bly be fairness equilibria. 
PROPOSITION  2:  Every fairness  equilib- 
rium  outcome  is  either  strictly positive  or 
weakly negative. 
Proposition 2 shows that there will always 
be  a  certain  symmetry of  attitude  in  any 
fairness  equilibrium.  It  will  never  be  the 
case that, in equilibrium, one person is kind 
while the other is unkind. 
While Propositions  1 and 2 pertain to all 
games, irrespective of  the  scale of  material 
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section several results that hold when mate- 
rial  payoffs  are  either  arbitrarily large  or 
arbitrarily small. To  do  so,  I will  consider 
classes of games that differ only in the scale 
of  the  material  payoffs.  Given  the  set  of 
strategies  S1 X S2  and  the  payoff functions 
(-1(a1,  a2),  n-2(a1,  a2)),  let  W be  the  set of 
games  with  strategies  Si X S2  and,  for  all 
X > 0, material payoffs 
(X  71(al,  a2),  X  n72(al,  a2)). 
Let  G(X)e  -'  be  the  game corresponding 
to a given value of  X. 
Consider Chicken again. It can be verified 
that, if X  is small enough, then both (dare, 
dare)  and  (chicken,  chicken)  are  fairness 
equilibria. Note  that, while  these  two  out- 
comes  are  (respectively)  mutual-min  and 
mutual-max  outcomes,  they  are  not  Nash 
equilibria. Yet,  when  X  is  small,  the  fact 
that they are not equilibria in the "material" 
game is unimportant, because  fairness con- 
siderations  will  start  to  dominate.  Propo- 
sition  3  shows  that  the  class  of  "strict" 
mutual-max and  mutual-min outcomes  are 
fairness equilibria for X  small enough. 
PROPOSITION  3:  For  any  outcome 
(a1, a2)  that is either a  strictly positive mu- 
tual-max  outcome  or  a  strictly  negative 
mutual-min outcome, there exists an X such 
that, for all X E (0, X),  (a1, a2)  is a fairness 
equilibrium  in G(X). 
While  Proposition  3  gives  sufficient condi- 
tions for outcomes  to be fairness equilibria 
when  material  payoffs  are  small,  Proposi- 
tion 4 gives conditions  for which outcomes 
will not be fairness equilibria when material 
payoffs are small. 
PROPOSITION  4:  Suppose that  (a1, a2)e 
(S1,S2)  is not a  mutual-max income, nor a 
mutual-min outcome, nor a Nash equilibrium 
in which either player is unable to lower the 
payoffs of the other player. Then there exists 
an X such that, for all X E (0, X),  (al,  a2)  is 
not a fairness equilibrium  in G(X). 
Together, Propositions 3 and 4 state that, 
for games with very small material payoffs, 
finding  the  fairness  equilibria  consists  ap- 
proximately of finding the Nash equilibria in 
each  of  the  following  two  hypothetical 
games:  (i)  the  game  in  which  each  player 
tries to maximize the other player's material 
payoffs  and  (ii)  the  game  in  which  each 
player tries  to  minimize  the  other  player's 
material payoffs. 
There  are  two  caveats  to  this  being  a 
general  characterization of  the  set  of  fair- 
ness  equilibria  in  low-payoff  games.  First, 
Proposition 3 does  not necessarily hold for 
mutual-max  or  mutual-min  outcomes  in 
which players are giving each other the eq- 
uitable payoffs (i.e., when the outcomes  are 
neutral). Thus, "non-strict" mutual-max and 
mutual-min  outcomes  need  to  be  double- 
checked.  Second,  it  is  also  necessary  to 
check whether  certain  types of  Nash  equi- 
libria in the original game are also fairness 
equilibria, even though they are neither mu- 
tual-max nor mutual-min outcomes. The po- 
tentially  problematic  Nash  equilibria  are 
those  in  which  one  of  the  players  has  no 
options  that will lower the  other's material 
payoffs. 
I now turn to the  case  in which material 
payoffs are very large. Proposition  5  states 
essentially  that  as material payoffs become 
large, the players' behavior is dominated by 
material self-interest.  In particular, players 
will play only Nash equilibria if the scale of 
payoffs is large enough. 
PROPOSITION  5:  If  (al,  a2)  is  a  strict 
Nash equilibrium  for games in  W, then there 
exists an X such that, for all X > X,  (al,  a2) 
is a fairness equilibrium  in G(X).17 If (al,  a2) 
is not  a  Nash  equilibrium for  games  in  W, 
then there exists an Xsuch  that, for all X>  X, 
(al,  a2)  is not a fairness equilibrium  in G(X). 
The only caveat to the  set of Nash  equi- 
libria being equivalent to the set of fairness 
equilibria  when  payoffs  are  large  is  that 
17 
17A Nash equilibrium is strict if each player is choos- 
ing  his  unique  optimal  strategy. Mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibria are, for instance,  never strict, because  they 
involve  the  players  being  indifferent  among  two  or 
more actions. 1292  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1993 
some non-strict Nash equilibria are not fair- 
ness equilibria. 
IV. Two  Applications 
One  context  in which  fairness  has  been 
studied is monopoly pricing (see e.g., Thaler, 
1985;  Kahneman  et  al.,  1986a,b).  Might 
consumers  see  conventional  monopoly 
prices  as unfair and  refuse  to  buy at  such 
prices even when worth it in material terms? 
If this is the  case,  then  even  a profit-maxi- 
mizing  monopolist  would  price  below  the 
level  predicted  by  standard economic  the- 
ory. I now present  a game-theoretic  model 
of  a monopoly  and show that this intuition 
is an implication of fairness equilibrium. 
I  assume  that  a  monopolist  has  costs  c 
per  unit  of  production,  and  a  consumer 
values the product at v. These  are common 
knowledge.  The  monopolist  picks  a  price 
p E [c, v]  as  the  consumer  simultaneously 
picks a "reservation" price  r E [c, v], above 
which he is not willing to pay. If p < r, then 
the good is sold at price p,  and the payoffs 
are p -  c  for the monopolist  and v -  p  for 
the  consumer.  If  p>  r,  then  there  is  no 
sale, and the payoffs are 0 for each player. 
Though this is formally an infinite-strategy 
game, it can be analyzed using my model of 
fairness.18  Applying Nash equilibrium allows 
any outcome.  We  might,  however,  further 
narrow our prediction, because  the strategy 
r = v for the consumer weakly dominates all 
other  strategies (this would  also be  the  re- 
sult  of  subgame  perfection  if  this  were  a 
sequential  game,  with  the  monopolist  set- 
ting the  price  first). Thus,  if players cared 
only  about  material  payoffs,  a  reasonable 
outcome  in  this  game  is  the  equilibrium 
where p = r = v, so that the monopolist  ex- 
tracts all the surplus from trade. 
What is the  highest price consistent with 
a fairness equilibrium at which this product 
could  be  sold?  First, what  is  the  function 
fc(r,  p),  how fair the  consumer  is being  to 
the monopolist?  Given that the monopolist 
sets  p,  the  only  question  is  whether  the 
monopolist gets profits p -  c or profits 0. If 
r 2  p, then the consumer is maximizing both 
the  monopolist's  and  his  own  payoffs,  so 
fc(r,  p) = 0. If  r < p,  then  the  consumer is 
minimizing  the  monopolist's  payoffs,  so 
fc(r,  p) = -  1. One implication of this is that 
the  monopolist  will always exploit  its posi- 
tion,  because  it  will  never  feel  positively 
toward the consumer; thus, r > p  cannot be 
a fairness equilibrium. 
Because  r < p  leads  to  no  trade,  this 
means that the only possibility for an equi- 
librium with trade is when  p =  r. How fair 
is  the  monopolist  being  to  the  consumer 
when  p =  r =  z?  Calculations show  that 
fM(z,z)=[c-z]/2[v-c].  Because  I  am 
considering only values of  z  between  c and 
v,  this  number  is  negative.  Any  time  the 
monopolist is not setting a price equal to its 
costs,  the  consumer  thinks  that  the 
monopolist  is being unfair. This is because 
the  monopolist  is  choosing  the  price  that 
extracts  as  much  surplus  as  possible  from 
the consumer, given the consumer's refusal 
to buy at a price higher than  z. 
To  see  whether p = r =  z  is  a  fairness 
equilibrium  for  a  given  z,  one  must  see 
whether  the  consumer would wish to  devi- 
ate  by  setting  r <  z,  thus  eliminating  the 
monopolist's  profits.  The  consumer's  total 
utility from r <  z  is 
UC=O+fM(Z,z)  [1+  -1]  =0. 
The  consumer's  total  utility  from  sticking 
with strategy  r =  z  is 
UC =  V-z  + fM(Z,  Z)  [1 +0] 
=  v  -  z  +  [c  -  z]/2[v  -  c]. 
Calculations  show  that  the  highest  price 
consistent with fairness equilibrium is given 
18Note, however, that I have artificially limited the 
strategy spaces of the players, requiring them to make 
only mutually beneficial offers; there are problems with 
the  definitions  of  this  paper  if  the  payoff space  of  a 
game  is unbounded.  Moreover,  though  I believe  that 
all  results  would  be  qualitatively  similar  with  more 
realistic models,  the  exact answers provided here  are 
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by 
z* = [2v2-2cu  + c]/[1  + 2v-2c]. 
This  number  is  strictly less  than  v  when 
v > c.  Thus,  the  highest  equilibrium  price 
possible  is  lower  than  the  conventional 
monopoly  price  when  fairness  is  added  to 
the equation. This reflects the arguments of 
Kahneman  et  al.  (1986a, b):  a  monopolist 
interested  in  maximizing profits ought  not 
to  set  price  at  "the  monopoly  price,"  be- 
cause  it  should  take  consumers'  attitudes 
toward fairness as a given. 
I can further consider  some  limit results 
as the stakes become  large in this game. Let 
the  monopolist's  costs  and  the  consumer's 
value be C  cX and V  uX, respectively. I 
represent the percentage of surplus that the 
monopolist  is  able  to  extract by (z*-  C)- 
(V -  C).  Algebra  shows  that  this  equals 
[2(V -  C)/[1  + 2(V -  C)],  and  the  limit  of 
this  as  X  becomes  arbitrarily large  is  1. 
That  is,  the  monopolist  is  able  to  extract 
"practically all" of the surplus, because  re- 
jecting  an  offer  for  the  sake  of  fairness  is 
more costly for the consumer. 
Another  interesting  implication  of  the 
model  is that dz*/dc  > 0 for all parameter 
values.  This means  that the  higher are the 
monopolist's  costs, the higher the price the 
consumer  will  be  willing to  pay (assuming 
that the  consumer  knows the  firm's costs). 
This is one interpretation of the results pre- 
sented in Thaler (1985): consumers are will- 
ing to pay more for the same product from 
a high-cost firm than from a low-cost firm. 
An area of economics where fairness has 
been  widely  discussed  (more  so  than  in 
monopoly  pricing)  is  labor  economics.19  I 
now present  an extended  example  that re- 
sembles the "gift-exchange" view of the em- 
ployment  relationship  discussed  in Akerlof 
(1982).  Consider  the  situation  in  which  a 
worker chooses  an effort level and the firm 
simultaneously  chooses  a  benefit  level  for 
the worker.20 Formally, the worker chooses 
either  a high or low effort level: e E {H, L}. 
If  e = H,  the  firm receives  revenue  R > 0, 
and the worker receives disutility y. If e =  L, 
the firm receives no revenue, and the worker 
experiences  no  disutility.  Simultaneously, 
the  firm chooses  a benefit  level  b e [0, R]. 
Material payoffs are as follows: 
/b1/2-y  if e=H 
w 
bl/2  if e=L 
rt(R  - b)1/2  if e=  H and b < R 
F 
0  if e=Lorb>R 
where  7rW  is the worker's material payoffs, 
and  WF  is the firm's material payoffs.21 
This situation is essentially a continuous- 
strategy prisoner's  dilemma,  because  each 
player has a dominant strategy: the worker 
maximizes his material payoffs by choosing 
e = L,  and  the  firm maximizes  its  material 
payoffs by choosing  b =  0. Thus, the unique 
Nash  equilibrium is the nasty one  in which 
e =  L  and  b = 0.  Because  this  outcome  is 
also  a mutual-min  outcome,  this  will be  a 
fairness  equilibrium  in  which  the  players 
feel  negatively toward each other. 
I now consider the possibility of a positive 
fairness equilibrium. First observe  that  the 
kindness of the worker to the firm is fw  = 
if the worker puts in high effort, and fw  = 
--  if the worker puts in low effort. This is 
because  e = H  involves  the  worker  fully 
yielding  along  the  Pareto  frontier  to  the 
firm, and  e = L  means  that  the  worker  is 
choosing  the  best  Pareto-efficient  point  for 
himself, given the firm's choice of  b. 
Given  the  worker's choice  of  effort,  the 
kindest the firm can be  to the worker is to 
choose  b=  R;  the  least  kind  is  clearly  to 
choose  b =  0. Therefore the equitable mate- 
rial payoff to  the  worker  is  R1/2/2-  y  if 
e =  H, and R1/2/2  if e =  L. Using this, one 
19For  some  examples  discussing  the  role  in  labor 
economics  of  fairness and related  issues,  see  Akerlof 
(1982),  John  Bishop  (1987),  James  N.  Baron  (1988), 
David I. Levine (1991, 1993), and Rotemberg (1992). In 
Rabin (1992), I applied this model of fairness to several 
more examples from labor economics. 
20This model is a version of one suggested to me by 
James Montgomery (pers. comm.). 
21The assumptions  that  the  parties  are  risk-averse 
and that the firm's payoff is 0 (rather than negative) if 
e = L are made for convenience  and are not essential. 1294  THE  AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1993 
can calculate that the  kindness of  the  firm 
to the worker is given by fF  = (b/R)1/2  - 
Using  this,  consider  the  possibility  of  a 
positive  fairness  equilibrium.  What  is  the 
firm's utility if  it  is  commonly known  that 
the worker is setting e =  H? It is given by 
UF = (R  -  b)1/2+  [2 + (b/R)1/2J 
Thus, the firm will maximize its utility by 
setting dUF 7db = 0, and one gets the result 
that  b* =  R /(1+  4R).  With this level of  b, 
the  firm's kindness  to  the  worker is  fF  = 
[1/(1  + 4R)]'/2  - 
Finally, in  order for  this  to  constitute  a 
fairness  equilibrium,  it  must  be  that  the 
worker would wish to set  e = H rather than 
e = L. The two possible utility levels are: 
Uw(e  H) = b1/2  _  y 
+ ([1(1+4R)]  1/2_ 
Uw(e  L) = b1/2 
+ ([1(1+4R)]  1/2  1}(-  ) 
Algebra  yields  the  conclusion  that  the 
worker would  not  strictly prefer  to  choose 
e = L if and only if 
R < 0.25[1/(0.5  +  Y)1/2_1]. 
For  all  such  combinations  of  R  and  y, 
therefore,  there  exists  a "gift-giving" equi- 
librium in which the worker sets e = H, and 
the  firm gives the worker a bonus of  b* = 
R /(1  + 4R).  Note  that the  larger is  y,  the 
smaller R must be for there to exist a gift- 
giving equilibrium.  The  rpason  for  this  is 
roughly as follows. If y  is large, the worker 
is very tempted  to  "cheat" the  firm by not 
working  hard.  The  only  way  he  will  not 
cheat  is if the  firm is being very kind. But 
the firm's material costs to yielding a given 
percentage  of  profits  to  the  worker  in- 
creases  as  R  increases;  thus,  only  if  R  is 
very small will  the  firm give  the  worker a 
generous  enough  share of profits to induce 
the worker to be kind. 
Player  2 
Grab  Share 
Grab  X,X  2X,O 
Player  1 
Share  O,2X  X,X 
FIGURE  5. EXAMPLE  5:  THE  GRABBING  GAME 
In  fact,  if  y 2  2,  then  there  is  no  gift- 
giving equilibrium, no  matter how  small is 
R. This is because the firm's material incen- 
tives  are  such  that  it  will  choose  to  be 
unkind  to  the  worker,  so  that  the  worker 
will choose  to be unkind to the firm. Thus, 
overall  the  model  says  that  workers  and 
firms will cooperate if neither is too tempted 
by material concerns to cheat. 
V.  Fairness and Welfare 
I consider now some welfare implications 
of  fairness.22 My  perspective  here  is  that 
the full utility functions (combining material 
payoffs and "fairness payoffs") are the util- 
ity functions with which to determine social 
welfare. As such, I believe  one  should care 
not  solely  about how concerns  for fairness 
support or interfere with material efficiency, 
but  also  about  how  these  concerns  affect 
people's  overall welfare. 
Consider Example 5 (see  Fig. 5).  In this 
game,  two people  are shopping,  and there 
are two cans of soup left.  Each person can 
either  try to  grab both  cans,  or not  try to 
grab. If both grab or both do not grab, they 
each  get  one  can;  if  one  grabs,  and  the 
22Robert H.  Frank  (1988,  1990)  and  others  have 
explored  how  the  existence  of  various  emotions  are 
understandable  as  adaptive  evolutionary  features  of 
humans.  While  this  view  of  emotions  as  "adaptive" 
may be broadly correct, Frank himself emphasizes that 
emotions  can  also  be  destructive  in  many situations. 
People's propensity for revenge can be harmful as well 
as helpful.  My model of people's  preferences  for fair- 
ness will help economists do exactly what is done with 
"material" preferences-study  how these  preferences 
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other  does  not,  then  the  grabber gets both 
cans. This is a constant-sum version  of  the 
prisoner's dilemma: each player has a domi- 
nant strategy, and the unique Nash equilib- 
rium  is  (grab,  grab).  As  in  the  prisoner's 
dilemma,  the  noncooperative  (grab,  grab) 
outcome is a fairness equilibrium, no matter 
the value of  X.  For small  X,  however, the 
positive, mutual-max outcome (share, share) 
is  also  a  fairness  equilibrium.  Moreover, 
because  these  two  fairness  equilibria yield 
the  same  material  payoffs,  (share,  share) 
always Pareto-dominates (grab, grab). 
Shopping for minor items is a situation in 
which people  definitely care about material 
payoffs, and this concern  drives the  nature 
of the interaction; but they probably do not 
care a great deal  about individual items.  If 
two  people  fight over  a  couple  of  cans  of 
goods, the social grief and bad tempers are 
likely  to  be  of  greater  importance  to  the 
people  than whether  they get the cans.  In- 
deed,  while  both  (grab,  grab)  and  (share, 
share) are fairness equilibria when material 
payoffs are arbitrarily  small, the overall util- 
ity  in  each  equilibrium  is  bounded  away 
from zero.23 As the material payoffs involved 
become  arbitrarily small,  equilibrium utility 
levels do  not  necessarily become  arbitrarily 
small. This is realistic: no matter how minor 
the  material  implications,  people's  well- 
being  is  affected  by  the  friendly  or  un- 
friendly behavior of others. 
In Example 5, as with many examples in 
this paper,  there  is both  a  strictly positive 
and a strictly negative fairness equilibrium. 
Are  there  games that contain  only positive 
or only negative fairness equilibria? If there 
are, this could be interpreted as saying that 
there are some economic situations that en- 
dogenously  determine  the  friendliness  or 
hostility of  the  people  involved. More  gen- 
erally, one  could  consider  the  question  of 
which types of economic structures are likely 
to generate which types of emotions. 
The  prisoner's  dilemma  illustrates  that 
there  do  exist situations  that endogenously 
generate  hostility.  Applying  Proposition  5, 
the  only  fairness  equilibrium  of  the  pris- 
oner's  dilemma  with  very  large  material 
payoffs is the Nash equilibrium, where both 
players defect.  This  fairness  equilibrium is 
strictly  negative.  Interpreting  a  negative 
fairness equilibrium as a situation in which 
parties  become  hostile  to  each  other,  this 
implies that if mutual cooperation  is bene- 
ficial,  but  each  person  has  an  irresistible 
incentive  to cheat when  others  are cooper- 
ating,  then  people  will  leave  the  situation 
feeling hostile. 
Are there opposite,  happier situations, in 
which the  strategic logic of  a situation  dic- 
tates that people will depart on good terms? 
In other words, are there  games for which 
all  fairness  equilibria yield  strictly positive 
outcomes?  Proposition 6 shows that the an- 
swer is no.24 
PROPOSITION  6:  In every game, there ex- 
ists a weakly negative fairness equilibrium. 
Proposition 6 states that it is never guar- 
anteed  that  people  will  part  with  positive 
feelings.  It  implies  a  strong  asymmetry in 
my model of fairness: there is a bias toward 
negative feelings. What causes this asymme- 
try? Recall that if a player is maximizing his 
own material payoffs, then he is being either 
mean  or  neutral  to  the  other  player,  be- 
cause being "nice" inherently involves sacri- 
ficing material well-being. Thus, while there 
are situations in which material self-interest 
tempts  a  player to  be  mean  even  if  other 
players are being kind, material self-interest 
will never tempt  a player to  be  kind when 
other  players are being  mean,  because  the 
23In particular,  the utility from (share, share) is 
positive for each player, and the utility from (grab, 
grab) is  negative for  each  player: (share, share) 
Pareto-dominates  (grab, grab). This again highlights 
the fact that social concerns  take over when material 
pavoffs  are small. 
24The proof of  Proposition  6 invokes the  existence 
theorem  of  GPS,  which  applies  only  if  the  kindness 
functions  are  continuous,  so  that  technically  I  have 
established  this  result only when  applying variants of 
the  kindness  functions  that  are  continuous.  See  Ap- 
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only way to  be  kind is  to  go  against one's 
material self-interest. 
VI.  Discussion  and Conclusion 
The  notion  of fairness in this paper cap- 
tures  several  important  regularities  of  be- 
havior but leaves out other issues. Evidence 
indicates, for instance, that people's  notions 
of  fairness  are  heavily  influenced  by  the 
status quo  and other  reference  points.  For 
instance,  Kahneman  et  al.  (1986a,b)  illus- 
trate  that  the  consumer's view  of  the  fair- 
ness  of  prices  charged  by  a  firm  can  be 
heavily  influenced  by  what  that  firm  has 
charged in the past. 
Extending the model to more general sit- 
uations will create issues that do not arise in 
the  simple  two-person,  normal-form, com- 
plete-information  games  discussed  in  this 
paper.  The  central  distinction  between 
two-person games and multiperson games is 
likely to be how a person behaves when he 
is  hostile  to  some  players but  friendly  to- 
ward others. The implications are clear if he 
is able to  choose  whom to  help  and whom 
to  hurt; it  is  more  problematic  if  he  must 
choose  either  to  help  everybody or to  hurt 
everybody, such as when  choosing  the  con- 
tribution level  to  a public  good.  Does  one 
contribute  to  reward those  who  have  con- 
tributed or not  contribute  to  punish  those 
who have not contributed. 
Extending the model to incomplete-infor- 
mation  games  is  essential  for  applied  re- 
search, but doing so will lead  to  important 
new issues.  Because  the  theory depends  so 
heavily on the motives of other players, and 
because  interpreting other  players' motives 
depends  on beliefs  about their payoffs and 
information, incomplete information is likely 
to  have a dramatic effect  on  decision-mak- 
ing.  Extending  the  model  to  sequential 
games is also essential for applied research. 
In conventional game theory, observing past 
behavior  can  provide  information;  in  psy- 
chological games, it can conceivably change 
the  motivations  of  the  players. An  impor- 
tant issue  arises: can players "force" emo- 
tions; that is, can a first-mover do something 
that will compel  a second  player to  regard 
him positively?  One  might imagine,  for in- 
stance,  that  an  analogue  to  Proposition  6 
Player  2 
Share  Grab 
Trust  6X,6X  0,12X 
Player  1 
Dissolve  5X,5X  5X,5X 
FIGURE  6.  EXAMPLE  6: LEAVING  A  PARTNERSHIP 
might  no  longer  be  true,  and  sequential 
games  could  perhaps  be  used  as  mecha- 
nisms that guarantee positive emotions. 
Finally, future research can also focus on 
modeling  additional  emotions.  In  Example 
6, for instance, my model predicts no coop- 
eration, whereas it seems  plausible that co- 
operation would take place (see  Fig. 6).25 
This game represents the following situa- 
tion.  Players  1  and  2  are  partners  on  a 
project that has thus far yielded total profits 
of  1OX. Player 1 must now withdraw from 
the  project.  If  player  1 dissolves  the  part- 
nership, the contract dictates that the play- 
ers split the profits fifty-fifty. But total prof- 
its would  be  higher  if  player  1  leaves  his 
resources in the project. To do so, however, 
he  must  forgo  his  contractual  rights  and 
trust player 2 to  share the  profits after the 
project is completed.  So, player 1 must de- 
cide whether  to  "dissolve" or to  "trust"; if 
he  trusts player 2, then  player 2 can either 
"grab" or "share." 
What will happen? According  to  the  no- 
tion  of  fairness  in  this  paper,  the  only 
(pure-strategy) equilibrium is for player 1 to 
split the  profits now, yielding  an inefficient 
solution.  The  desirable  outcome  (trust, 
share) is not possible  because  player 2 will 
deviate. The reason is that he attributes no 
positive motive to player 1-while  it is true 
that  player  1  trusted  player  2,  he  did  so 
simply to  increase  his own  expected  mate- 
rial payoff. No kindness was involved. 
One  might  think  that  (trust,  share)  is  a 
reasonable outcome. This would be the out- 
come,  for  instance,  if  it  is  assumed  that 
25 
A related example was first suggested to me by Jim 
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players wish to be  kind to  those  who  trust 
them.  If player 1 plays "trust" rather than 
"split," he  is showing he  trusts player 2. If 
player 2  feels  kindly toward player  1 as  a 
result of  this trust, then  he  might not grab 
all  the  profits.  If  it  is  concluded  that  the 
idea  that  people  are  motivated  to  reward 
trust is psychologically sound, then  it could 
be incorporated into formal models. 
APPENDIX  A: 
THE  KINDNESS  FUNCTION  CAN  BE 
GENERALIZED 
There  is a broad class of  kindness  func- 
tions  for  which  all  of  the  results  of  this 
paper hold. Indeed,  the proofs of all results 
contained  in  the  body  of  the  paper  are 
general  enough  that  they  establish  the  re- 
sults for the  kindness functions  that  I now 
define. 
Definition  Al  requires  that  (i)  fairness 
cannot lead to infinitely positive or infinitely 
negative utility, and (ii) how kind player i is 
being to player j is an increasing function of 
how high a material payoff player i is giving 
player  j. 
Definition  Al:  A  kindness  function  is 
bounded and increasing if: 
(i)  there  exists  a  number  N  such  that 
fi(ai,  bj)E [-  N, N]  for  all  aE  Si  and 
b. ES  S;  and 
(ii)  fi(ai,  bj) >  fM(a',  b1)  if  and  only  if 
7rr(bj,  ai) > rj(bj, a'). 
Definition  A2  requires  that  the  payoff 
that player j  "deserves" is strictly between 
player  j's  worst  and  best  Pareto-efficient 
payoffs, so long as the Pareto frontier is not 
a singleton. 
Definition A2:  Consider  11(bj),  Trjh(bj),  and 
Trj(b1)  as defined in the  paper. A  kindness 
function  fi(ai,kb)  is  a  Pareto split  if there 
exists some  rje(bj)  such that: 
(i)  irj(bj,  ai) > 7rje(bj)  implies that fi(ai,  bj) 
> 0;  7j(bj, ai) = irr(b1)  implies  that 
f.(a,  b)  =0;  and irr  (bj,  a ) <  wrje(bj)  im- 
plies thiat fi(ai,  bj) < 0; 
(ii)  Trjh(b)  2  Trje(bj)  2  nrj(bj);  and 
(iii)  if  1rjh(bj)  >  rjf(bj), then  irjh(bj) >  rje(bj) 
Propositions  1, 2,  and  6  are  all true  for 
any kindness  function  meeting  Definitions 
Al  and A2.  Propositions  3, 4,  and 5,  how- 
ever,  pertain  to  when  material  payoffs are 
made  arbitrarily large  or  arbitrarily small. 
In order for these  results to hold, one must 
guarantee  that  notions  of  the  fairness  of 
particular  outcomes  do  not  dramatically 
change when  all payoffs are doubled  (say). 
Definition A3 is a natural way to do so. 
Definition A3:  A kindness function fi(ai,  bj) 
is  affine  if  changing  all  payoffs  for  both 
players  by  the  same  affine  transformation 
does not change the value of  fi(ai,  bj). 
All the propositions in this paper hold for 
any kindness  function  meeting  Definitions 
Al,  A2, and A3. One substantial generaliza- 
tion  allowed  for  here  is  that  the  kindness 
function can be  sensitive  to  affine transfor- 
mations  of  one  player's  payoffs.  If  all  of 
player 2's payoffs are doubled,  then  it may 
be  that  fairness  dictates  that  he  get 
more-or  less-than  before. The definition 
and all of the limit results simply character- 
ize  what  happens  if  both  players'  payoffs 
are comparably changed. 
Knowing that  the  general  results  of  this 
paper  hold  for  a  large  class  of  kindness 
functions is also important should existence 
be problematic. While fairness equilibria ex- 
ist  in  all  of  the  examples  of  this  paper,  I 
have proved no general existence result and 
cannot invoke the existence theorem of GPS, 
because  of possible discontinuities. 
The kindness function  in the  text can be 
discontinuous  in  b1 at points  where  irjh(bj) 
=  -rjm,n(bj);  at such points,  lI(bj) is a single 
point,  and  fi(ai,  bj)  is  set  equal  to  zero 
independent  of  ai. The discontinuity comes 
from the fact that, by normalizing the kind- 
ness  function  by  [  h(bj)  -  1rrjin(bj)],  the 
kindness  function  can  be  bounded  away 
from  zero  even  when  HO(b1)  is  arbitrarily 
small. While I chose  this kindness function 
so  as to  emphasize  that kindness  or mean- 
ness  can  be  large  issues  even  when  the 
stakes are small, this property could be made 
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the kindness function as 
g(ai,  bj) 
j(bj  , a).-  rje(bj) 
(1  - 
y)[  Tjh(bj)-  7'rin(bj)  +  y(7rmax  _  7rmin)] 
where  wrax  and  <r"m  are player j's  maxi- 
mum  and  minimum  payoffs  in  the  entire 
game. This kindness function is well-defined 
for  all  y E (0,1],  so  long  as  Tjmax +  Trn 
(which  is  true  unless  one  has  a  game  in 
which  no  decisions  by  either  player  could 
possibly affect player j's  payoff). A  second 
type of  discontinuity in the  kindness  func- 
tions is that 7r-(b2) can be discontinuous in 
b2. This discontinuity can be  smoothed  out 
with the following definition: for D > 0, let 
72e( b2, D) 
-  maxb EB2{7r2(b*)  + Dlb2  -  b*11}. 
It  can  be  shown  that  72-(b2, D)  is  a  well- 
defined function and is continuous in b2. To 
construct  a  continuous  kindness  function 
(and thus allow the  application of the  GPS 
existence  proof),  one  need  merely  replace 
7w  by wr(b2, D)  in the  above definition.  It 
can be shown (proof available from the au- 
thor upon request) that there exists a D > 0 
defined for each game such that the result- 
ing  kindness  function  satisfies  Definitions 
Al,  A2,  and  A3  for  all  y.  Moreover,  by 
choosing  y  arbitrarily close  to  0  and  D 
arbitrarily  large,  one  essentially  defines 
kindness functions that are "smoothed" ver- 
sions of that used in the paper. 
While the precise kindness function used 
is not important to the qualitative results of 
this  paper,  the  way  I  specify  the  overall 
utility function  is perhaps more  restrictive. 
One aspect that clearly determines some of 
the  results  in  this  paper  is  the  fact  that  I 
completely exclude "pure altruism"; that is, 
I assume that unless  player 2 is being kind 
to player 1, player 1 will have no  desire to 
be kind to player 2. Psychological evidence 
suggests that, while people  are substantially 
motivated by the  type of  "contingent  altru- 
ism"  I  have  incorporated  into  the  model, 
pure altruism can also sometimes be impor- 
tant. 
One  natural  way  to  expand  the  utility 
function to incorporate pure altruism would 
be as follows: 
Ui(ai,  bj, ci) 
-ri(ai, bj) 
+ [ a + (1-  a)fj(bj, ci)]  [1 + fi(ai,  bj)] 
where a E [0, 1]. 
In this utility function,  if  a > 0, then  the 
player i will wish to be kind to player j even 
if  player j  is  being  "neutral"  to  player  i. 
The relative importance of pure versus con- 
tingent altruism is captured by the parame- 
ter  a;  if  a  is small, then  outcomes  will be 
much as in the model of this paper; if  a  is 
close to 1, then pure altruism will dominate 
behavior. 
As  discussed  above  with  regard  to  the 
kindness  function,  my model  assumes  that 
the  fairness  utility  is  completely  indepen- 
dent  of  the  scale  of  the  material  payoffs. 
Consider  a situation  in which  a proposer's 
offer  to  split  $1  evenly  is  rejected  by  a 
decider.  My model  says that  the  proposer 
will  leave  the  situation  unhappy  not  only 
because  he  has  no  money,  but because  he 
was  badly  treated.  Yet  my  model  implies 
that the proposer will be as unhappy, but no 
more so,  when  leaving a situation  in which 
the  decider  rejected  an  offer  to  split  $1 
million evenly. 
This seems unrealistic-the  bitterness he 
feels  should be larger the greater the harm 
done.  The  assumption  could,  however,  be 
relaxed  while  maintaining  all  the  general 
results  of  the  paper.  I  could  specify  the 
utility function as: 
Ui(ai, bj, ci) 
-  ri(ai, bj) + G(X) -  fj(bj, ci)  [1 + fi(ai, bj)] 
where  G(X)  is  positive  and  increasing 
in  X.26 
26This specification and one  of the conditions men- 
tioned  to maintain the  limit results were  suggested  by 
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This might create problems  for the limit 
results of the paper. However, the condi- 
tions that G(X)/X  ->  0 as X -X  o  and that 
G(X)  is bounded away from 0 as  X -)0 
would suffice  for all propositions  to hold. In 
this case, I  am assuming that a  person's 
fairness  utility  is less sensitive  to the scale of 
payoffs  than is his material  utility, not that 
it is totally  insensitive. 
APPENDIX  B:  PROOFS 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  1: 
Since (a1,  a2) is a Nash equilibrium,  both 
players must be maximizing  their material 
payoffs. First, suppose that  (al, a2)  is  a 
mutual-max  outcome. Then both f1 and f2 
must be  nonnegative. Thus, both players 
have positive regard for the  other. Since 
each player  is choosing  a strategy  that maxi- 
mizes both his own material  well-being  and 
the material  well-being  of the other player, 
this must maximize  his overall  utility. 
Next, suppose  that  (a1,  a2) is a mutual-min 
outcome.  Then f1 and f2 will both be non- 
positive, so that each player will be moti- 
vated to decrease  the material  well-being  of 
the other. Since he is doing so while simul- 
taneously  maximizing his  own  material 
well-being,  this must maximize  his utility. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  2: 
Suppose that an outcome has one player 
being positive (fi  >  0), while the other player 
is not being positive (fj < 0). If fi  >  0, then 
it must be that player i could increase his 
payoff  in such a way that player  j would be 
harmed,  simply  by changing  his strategy  to 
maximize his own material interest. If f;  <  0, 
it is inconsistent with utility maximization 
for player i  not to  do so; therefore, this 
outcome cannot be a fairness equilibrium. 
The only outcomes consistent  with fairness 
equilibrium,  therefore, are those for which 
both  fi  and  fj  are strictly positive,  or nei- 
ther is. This establishes  the proposition. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  3: 
As  X -)  0,  the  gain  in  material  payoffs 
from changing  a strategy  approaches  zero, 
and eventually  it is dominated  by the fair- 
ness payoffs. If (al,a2)  is a strictly positive 
mutual-max outcome, each  player would 
strictly  prefer to play ai, since this uniquely 
maximizes  the fairness  product.  Thus, this is 
a fairness  equilibrium.  If (a1,  a2) is a strictly 
negative mutual-min  outcome, each player 
would strictly prefer to play ai, since this 
uniquely maximizes the  fairness product. 
Thus, this too would be a fairness equilib- 
rium. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  4: 
Suppose that (a1,  a2) is not a Nash equi- 
librium. Then (without loss of  generality) 
player 1 is not maximizing  his material  pay- 
offs. 
Suppose that player 1 is not minimizing 
player 2's payoffs.  Then he is not minimiz- 
ing f1. Given that player 1 is also not maxi- 
mizing  his own material  payoffs,  this can be 
maximizing behavior only if f2 >  0. Player 2 
will choose  f2 >  0 only if f1 > 0. Thus, both 
f1  and  f2  are greater than 0; but if the 
material  payoffs are small, this means that 
the players  must  choose to maximize  f1 and 
f2,  so that this must be a mutual-max  out- 
come. 
Suppose that player 1 is not maximizing 
player 2's payoffs.  Then he is not maximiz- 
ing f1. If the payoffs are small, and given 
that player 1  is  not  maximizing  his own 
payoffs, this implies that f2 < 0. This means, 
as payoffs  are small, that player 1 will mini- 
mize player  2's payoffs,  so that f1 < 0. If he 
does so, player  2 will in turn  minimize  player 
l's payoffs.  Thus, this outcome is a min-min 
outcome. This establishes  that if (a,,  a2)  is 
not  a  mutual-max, mutual-min, or  Nash 
equilibrium,  then it will not be a fairness 
equilibrium  for small enough X. 
Now suppose that (a1, a2) is a Nash equi- 
librium,  but one in which each player  could 
lower the other player's  material  payoffs  by 
changing  his strategy.  Suppose that (a1,  a2) 
is not a mutual-max  outcome.  Then (without 
loss of generality)  player 1 could increase 
player  2's material  payoffs.  Since player 1 is 
maximizing  his own material payoffs in a 
way that hurts player 2, it is known that 
f1  < 0. This can be optimal  for small X only 
if  f2  <  0.  If  f2  < 0,  then earlier arguments 
imply that this must be a mutual-min  out- 
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optimal  for  player  2  only  if  she  has  no 
choice of lowering player l's  payoffs; other- 
wise, the fact that f1 < 0 would compel  her 
to  change  strategies.  This  condition  on 
player  2's  choices  directly  contradicts  the 
assumption that she  could  lower player l's 
payoffs. This establishes the proposition. 
PROOF  OF PROPOSITION  5: 
If  (a1, a2)  is  a  strict  Nash  equilibrium, 
then the difference in material payoffs from 
playing  the  equilibrium  strategy  versus  a 
nonequilibrium strategy becomes  arbitrarily 
large  as  X  becomes  arbitrarily large.  Be- 
cause the fairness gains and losses are inde- 
pendent of X,  ai eventually becomes a strict 
best reply to  a1 as X  becomes large. 
If (a1, a2) is not a Nash equilibrium, then, 
for at least one  player, the benefit in mate- 
rial payoffs from deviating from (a1, a2) be- 
comes  arbitrarily large as  X  becomes  arbi- 
trarily large. Because  the fairness gains and 
losses  are independent  of  X,  ai  is eventu- 
ally dominated by some other strategy with 
respect to  ai  as X  becomes  large. 
PROOF  OF PROPOSITION  6: 
From the material game, consider the psy- 
chological  game from the  preferences  Vi= 
7ri(ai,  bj)  + min[  fj(ci, bj),  O] min[  fi(ai, bj),  O]. 
When  the  kindness  functions  are  continu- 
ous,  GPS's  general  existence  result  means 
that this game has at least one  equilibrium, 
(a*, a*).  I  will  now  argue  that  any  such 
equilibrium is also a fairness equilibrium. 
First, I show that, for i = 1, 2, fi(a*,  a*) < 
0.  Suppose  fi(a*,a*)>  0.  Let  a'  be  such 
that  at  E  argmaxa  sITi(a,  a7 ).  Then 
i(a  ati  j,  a*  )  >  Vi ( a*,  al*,  a*  ) 
which  contradicts  the  premise.  This  is be- 
cause the material payoff to i is higher with 
a'  than with  a*,  and because  fM(a, a*) <  0, 
so  that  the  fairness  payoff  cannot  be  any 
lower than from  a*. 
Thus,  for  i-=1,2,  fi(aa*,a*)<0;  but  this 
implies  that,  for  each  player,  maximizing 
V(a  , a*,  a*)  is  the  same  as  maximizing 
Ui(ai,aj,a*).  Thus,  (a>,a  )  is  a  fairness 
equilibrium. 
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